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self-proclaimed Southern strategist, is
simply and reasonably dismissed as a
fantasist.
Given the number of bad books that
have been written about the Civil War,
it is a pleasure to find a good one.
Stoker is a solid, competent author who
makes his points in clear convincing
prose. Written from a refreshing viewpoint, The Grand Design is a book
worth reading.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin–Baghdad Express:
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for
World Power, 1898–1918. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2010. 496pp. $29.95

If ever there was a story of epic unintended consequences and “might have
beens,” Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin–
Baghdad Express is it. Approaching the
First World War in the Middle East
from the German and Ottoman perspectives, McMeekin expands our
Anglo-centric understanding of the
conflict. In doing so, he unveils a
breathtaking catalogue of misunderstandings, miscalculations, simple mistakes, and missed opportunities that
would be comic if not so horribly
tragic.
While the title conjures images of the
fabled Orient Express, the book is a
first-rate history of the diplomatic jockeying of the German and Ottoman Empires to gain advantage over their
respective archrivals, Britain and Russia. The railway would be a tool to enable Germany’s Drang nach Osten
(drive to the East) while strengthening
the Turks (bitter enemies of Germany’s

Russian rivals) by linking the farthest
reaches of the Ottoman Empire with
the seat of power in Istanbul. The completion of the railway, first to Baghdad
and then extended on to Basra, would
have profound political, economic, and
strategic importance.
To achieve this end Germany designed
a strategy to undermine the cohesion of
the British Empire through Islamic holy
war. That strategy was an outgrowth of
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s reckless and amateurish meddling in Oriental affairs.
The kaiser believed that his affinity for
Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of the
Faithful, and for all things Islamic
would enable him to engineer a jihad
against the hated British, targeting the
empire’s large Muslim populations in
India, Egypt, and beyond. The kaiser, in
league with the sultan and later the
Young Turks, embarked on ambitious
propaganda and military campaigns designed to rally Muslims to the sultan’s
call for jihad, despite the facts that most
educated Muslims had long given up
the idea of the caliphate; that there was
no distinction in Islamic jurisprudence
or practice between a bad infidel (British, French) and good one (German,
Austrian, American, or maybe Italian);
that Sunni and Shia Muslims had vastly
different views of jihad; and that the
British had for years controlled access
to Mecca for the hajj. McMeekin also
points out the oddness of German
support for jihad juxtaposed with the
German-based Zionist movement,
which actually anticipated Britain’s
Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The cast of characters includes soldiers,
statesmen, adventurers, charlatans, humanitarians, and thugs from across Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, and the
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Middle East. Many are familiar, such as
Kaiser Wilhelm, Abdulhamid II, and T.
E. Lawrence. Still more are rather obscure. Central among this group are
“Baron” Max von Oppenheim, a Jewish
scion of the famous banking family,
and Curt Prufer, a scholar assigned to
the German embassy in Cairo. Both
were Orientalists, both were devotees of
Kaiser Wilhelm, and both shared the
kaiser’s vision of jihad. Together they
worked to foment holy war from Libya
in the west through Egypt, Abyssinia,
Sudan, Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and
India. After the war they emerged in the
forefront of Nazi anti-Semitism and the
atrocities that it produced.
A common theme found throughout
the narrative is that of miscalculation
born of ignorance or misunderstanding
of basic historical, cultural, political,
and religious truths. A prime example is
Germany’s tendency to see the Muslim
world as either for the Germans or
against them, while missing the vast
range of options in between, a problem
that persists in varying degrees today.
Another is the complexity of the region
that breeds such miscalculations.
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McMeekin’s treatment of the struggle
for control of Baku in August 1918 provides a brief but illuminating example
of just how complex that corner of the
world can be. With British, German,
Russian, Turkish, Armenian, Azeri, and
other factions vying for control of the
city (and its oil), fighting was not only
savage but included intramural attacks
upon allies. As we look at Afghanistan,
Pakistan, the Caucasus, and other tribal
regions today, we can see that the same
elements of complexity and confusion
that bedeviled earlier Western strategists is ours to deal with again, and
again.
Sean McMeekin is assistant professor of
international relations at Bilkent University, in Ankara, Turkey. His work is
based on German, Turkish, Austrian,
Russian, and American archives, as well
as secondary sources. It is carefully researched, well documented, and presented with a lively style that combines
analysis, insight, and a mix of irony and
wry humor that makes the book as
readable as it is informative.
COL. THOMAS E. SEAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia
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